Interviewing Al-Qaeda-Related Subjects: A Law Enforcement Perspective by Gelles, Michael et al.
University of South Florida
Scholar Commons
Mental Health Law & Policy Faculty Publications Mental Health Law & Policy
1-1-2006
Interviewing Al-Qaeda-Related Subjects: A Law
Enforcement Perspective
Michael Gelles
Robert McFadden
Randy Borum
University of South Florida, wborum@usf.edu
Bryan Vossekuil
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/mhlp_facpub
Part of the Political Science Commons, Psychology Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public
Policy and Public Administration Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Mental Health Law & Policy at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Mental Health Law & Policy Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Scholar Commons Citation
Gelles, Michael; McFadden, Robert; Borum, Randy; and Vossekuil, Bryan, "Interviewing Al-Qaeda-Related Subjects: A Law
Enforcement Perspective" (2006). Mental Health Law & Policy Faculty Publications. 539.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/mhlp_facpub/539
23
Al-Qaeda-related subjects: a less enforcement perspective
Chapter 2
Al-Qaeda-related subjects: a law 
enforcement perspective
Michael G. Gelles, Robert McFadden,
Randy Borum and Bryan Vossekuil
Introduction
National security and public safety are primary concerns for all 
professionals who investigate terrorism (White 2003; Borum 2004). 
These investigations frequently involve questioning subjects, either 
for purposes of intelligence gathering or for investigations that may 
lead to criminal prosecution. The objective of these interviews/
interrogations is to gather accurate and reliable information that 
furthers security, safety, intelligence and investigative interests. The 
current threat environment, however, poses some particular challenges 
for law enforcement professionals investigating terrorism (Hoffman 
1999; Laqueur 1999; Simon 2003; Borum, Fein, Vossekuil, Gelles, and 
Shumate 2004; Borum et al. 2004).
Many ‘adversaries’ in the global war on terrorism have beliefs, 
ideologies, cultures and life experiences that differ markedly from 
those of their interrogators – and often differ from those of criminals 
with whom law enforcement professionals more typically interact. 
Terrorist groups and networks afﬁliated with al-Qaeda, in particular, 
pose ominous threats and present enormous challenges to the 
investigative and intelligence personnel who pursue them. Al-Qaeda 
and related operatives are committed to a cause: not just to their 
own personal interests, but to the interests of the ‘brothers’ (group) 
of Islam. They may be trained to withstand questioning and to utilize 
counter-interrogation techniques (Gunaratna 2001). 
Various interrogation strategies have been employed with success 
against al-Qaeda-afﬁliated subjects since the ﬁrst attack on the 
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World Trade Center in 1993. These approaches were reﬁned over the 
ensuing decade, incorporating lessons learnt along the way. They 
have proven effective in the interrogation and/or prosecutions of 
al-Qaeda terrorists associated with the Africa Embassy bombings in 
1998, the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 and the 11 September 2001 
attacks.
To date, the most extensive interviews with al-Qaeda operatives 
have been conducted with Sunni extremists from Middle Eastern Arab 
societies who are held in detainee status. Just as there are differences, 
however, in how one might approach a custodial versus a non-
custodial interview, there may be features and effects of the detainee 
situation that are unique and may not generalize well to other kinds 
of law enforcement interviews with people of investigative concern. 
Nevertheless, the collective experience of professionals involved 
in detainee interviews and interrogations may offer insights into the 
thinking and behaviours of al-Qaeda-related individuals, especially 
those who are from, or have roots in, Middle Eastern Arab countries. 
Knowledge about the expectations, communications and behaviours 
of these persons may aid other investigators to improve interrogation 
efforts. In addition, what has been learnt about gathering information 
from these people may inform the efforts of law enforcement and 
intelligence professionals who work with other al-Qaeda-related 
people (Einesman 1999).
To state immediately the central theme of this paper: a relationship/
rapport-based approach with Middle Eastern Arab subjects who may 
be afﬁliated with al-Qaeda networks will generally result in more 
truthful and reliable information than will an aggressive approach. 
This is an approach that is advocated in almost all interrogations, 
not just with Middle Eastern subjects. The following guidelines are 
offered as an interrogation approach that works well with national 
security cases and criminal cases. In all instances where interrogation 
is conducted for the purpose of eliciting reliable and non-coerced 
confessions, a rapport-based approach is recommended. In the speciﬁc 
case of terrorism, in the opinion of the authors aggressive strategies 
been ineffective and, whilst yielding information, the information is 
often not reliable or actionable. Aggressive and forceful interrogation 
of a subject who may be trained to anticipate torture and to resist 
questioning is likely to be counterproductive to the goal of eliciting 
accurate, reliable and useful information (Arrigo 2003). 
Clearly differences exist between subjects of al-Qaeda-related 
terrorist investigations and subjects of other investigations more 
commonly conducted by law enforcement (Navarro 2002). This 
25
Al-Qaeda-related subjects: a less enforcement perspective
chapter seeks to highlight some of these differences and to provide 
some suggestions, based on experience, about how best to deal 
with them. The chapter offers background information and context 
for interrogating Middle Eastern Arab al-Qaeda-afﬁliated detainees 
and subjects of investigation. It also suggests what has been learnt 
about general interview approaches during detention. The chapter 
recommends ways to navigate interviews: preparation, development 
of rapport, development of themes, management of resistance, and 
detection of deception. 
This is not a ‘how to’ chapter. There is much to be learnt about 
interrogation, especially with regard to strategies that take cognizance 
of the culture, background and expectations of the subject being 
interviewed (Gudjonsson 2003). The goal of this chapter is to outline 
some themes and ideas that may result in more effective and useful 
interrogation strategies and practices.
Understanding contexts for interrogating subjects of  
al-Qaeda-related investigations
Successful strategies recognize that Arab culture is one that is built 
on relationships, oriented towards a larger collective, and focused on 
impression management (Nydell 2002). Within much Arab culture is 
an acceptance of conspiracy theories as a means of explaining the 
reasons behind certain events. Osama Bin Laden has reinforced these 
long-standing beliefs that Americans and Jews and their Western 
allies are seeking to control and dominate the Middle East and attack 
the faith of Islam. In accepting these theories, it could be said that 
al-Qaeda supporters and sympathizers have suspended critical 
thinking. They might have done so in order to ﬁnd meaning, 
direction and structure through a strong afﬁliation with a radical 
Islamist view of the West and a commitment to the jihad (Borum 
and Gelles 2004).
Knowledge of these underlining factors may help an investigator 
to assess deception during an interrogation and to elicit accurate and 
useful information from al-Qaeda operatives and supporters. For 
example, many Middle Eastern Arab males think associatively. From a 
Western point of view, their thinking may appear to jump from point 
to point and from place to place in a discussion. Associative thinking 
differs from Western ‘linear’ thinking (Nydell 2002). Linear thinking 
is goal oriented, with one point following the next in logical order. 
Understanding the manner in which information is communicated 
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is critical in analysing the reliability and usefulness of information 
offered during an interview or interrogation.
Understanding motivation and the importance  
of relationship
In our exploration of the motivation of al-Qaeda-afﬁliated extremists, 
we must rely heavily on our own observations, assessments and 
experiences with subjects who have been captured, detained and 
interrogated. At the time of writing, there has been no systematic study 
of personal pathways to militant Islamist ideology or of recruitment 
into its terrorist factions. The existing social science literature and 
our own appraisals, however, do suggest several vulnerabilities 
that frequently appear in these subjects. Understanding these 
vulnerabilities may inform an examination of what may motivate 
these men to commit to an extremist view of Islam and to waging 
jihad against the West. 
Perhaps we ﬁrst should clarify that the constellation of these 
motivational themes does not comprise a ‘proﬁle’ of the Islamic 
extremist. In fact, there is no such proﬁle that can reliably be based 
on demographic, psychological or social characteristics (Borum et 
al. 2003). The extremists of whom we have knowledge come from 
a range of social classes and possess varying levels of intellect and 
education. Instead, the thematic consistency we have observed is that 
many of these men, prior to their involvement with militant Islamist 
ideas, were actively seeking meaning, direction, structure and 
connection in their lives. This pursuit often appeared to be related to 
their radicalization (Borum and Gelles 2004).
It is not uncommon to hear stories amongst al-Qaeda-afﬁliated 
detainees of how they were drawn into a jihadist group through 
others in their social network. Marc Sageman (2004) estimates that 
more than two thirds of his sample of al-Qaeda-associated extremists 
had already formed into a social collective (in Western terms ‘a 
bunch of guys’) before they committed their terrorist acts. Social 
networks and relationships are particularly powerful in collectivist 
societies – such as in Asian and Middle Eastern cultures – where 
Islam and the presence of al-Qaeda also tend to be most prevalent. 
People raised with collectivist values quite naturally and normatively 
see themselves (and other individuals) as being part of a larger 
meaningful cause. The identities and perceptions of self-worth 
amongst many in the Middle East – and to some extent in Asia – 
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are inﬂuenced strongly by the idea that ‘who I am is part of whom 
I am with’. Seeking connections is critical in a world where one’s 
value is deﬁned by whom you know and who is in your network 
(in Arabic, Wasta; Cunningham and Sarayrah 1993 ). These priorities 
are distinctly different from traditional Western values that tend to 
emphasize individual achievement and self-worth (Nydell 2002). 
Thus, in his quest for personal meaning, direction and structure 
(particularly in an environment where extremist sects and ideologies 
are prevalent), a man will often suspend critical thinking, commit to 
a particular mosque, leader or collective that advocates militant jihad 
and then, by making that commitment, develop the capabilities and 
connections to participate in potential terrorist attacks against Western 
interests (Borum and Gelles 2004). The extremist mosque is generally 
small, private and, in many cases, found just by happenstance. For 
example, one extremist told an interviewer that it just happened to be 
in his ‘patch.’ Once connected, however, they are powerful vehicles 
of jihadist ideology. Sageman (2004) found that nearly half of the 400 
al-Qaeda extremists he studied came from just 10 mosques. 
The mosque may provide a refuge from the turmoil of inner 
psychological conﬂicts and crisis. For all people, participating 
with a group meets an initial need for afﬁliation and belonging, 
particularly for those who have failed to afﬁliate and be validated 
elsewhere or who have not lived up to the expectations of their 
families (Luckabaugh et al. 1997). Islam – and jihadist ideology – 
provides structure, meaning and identity (Monroe and Kreidie 1997). 
Sharia (Islamic law) and the teachings of the imam impart a needed 
structure, and the unequivocal rules are deﬁned by the Koran and 
Hadith. Status is achieved through memorization of the Koran, not by 
analysis of ambiguities and nuances.
The radical collective fosters and maintains an unquestioning 
adherence to its tenets and to one another as ‘brothers’. These 
individuals learn quickly that questioning beliefs leads to rejection, 
whilst embracing them reinforces the primary motive of afﬁliation 
and connectivity (Marsella 2003). Those who question may be 
marginalized or even shunned by others.
Understanding jihad and the history of Sunni extremism:  
the path to commitment
The Arabic language root of jihad (the verb j-h-d) is deﬁned as 
‘to endeavor, strive, labor, take great pains’ (Dictionary of Modern 
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Written Arabic). The noun form is sometimes – depending on one’s 
perspective – deﬁned as a great effort in the struggle to maintain the 
straight path of Islam. Bernard Lewis (2003), an eminent historian of 
Islam and the Middle East, notes the concept of jihad in the great 
majority of topics in the Arabic language, and the context of Islamic 
issues refers to a religious duty to wage holy war against inﬁdels or 
non-believers, for the sake of God Almighty (Allah). Understandably, 
in the current context of radical Islam, some moderate Muslims have 
claimed that jihad is misunderstood in the West, and that the word 
and concept are intended to characterize the effort a Muslim must 
exert to live a good life. A fair reading, though, of orthodox Sunni 
and Shia teachings – even setting aside extremist variants – supports 
Lewis’s contention that jihad almost always refers to the duty to 
ﬁght against ‘the enemies of Islam’. Modern-day extremists such as 
Osama Bin Ladin have been profoundly inﬂuenced by the notion 
of this ‘neglected duty’ – i.e. jihad (al-farida al-gha’iba) – as were the 
Egyptian Islamist philosophers of the 1950 and 1960s, Sayyad Qutb 
and Muhammad al-Farraj. Qutb and al-Farraj averred that after faith 
in God (iman) and the belief in only one true God (tawhid), there 
is no more important duty for all Muslims than jihad against the 
unbelievers (Lewis 2003).
Within US government security and intelligence circles, discussions 
of Islamic extremism usually distinguish between the two major 
branches of the religion, Sunni and Shia. Militant extremism amongst 
Shia Muslims is most often associated in the Western public’s mind 
with the Iranian US embassy hostage crisis of 1979, and with terrorist 
acts of the Lebanese Hizballah. In contrast to the current form of 
Sunni extremism, Shia terrorism has been motivated primarily by 
nationalist objectives, not by strivings for a worldwide Islamic utopia 
(Ridell and Cotterell 2003). 
In the current security environment, however, there is consensus 
amongst counter-terrorism experts and policy-makers, at least in 
America, that Sunni extremism currently poses the greatest threat to 
Western interests. The voice of these jihadists is most aptly represented 
in the words and deeds of al-Qaeda and its associated groups, and 
of men such as Osama Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri and number 
of lesser known shaykhs. These jihadist groups and the men behind 
them have a rigid view of Islam and have little tolerance for those 
whose beliefs diverge from them. They oppose Jews, Christians 
and less devout Muslims (Borum and Gelles 2004). Their world is 
divided between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The proponents of this ideology, 
including Sayyad Qutb, Muhammad ’Abd al-Salam al-Farraj and 
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’Abdallah Azzam, as well as their contemporary counterparts such 
as Bin Ladin, believe two competing forces seek to dominate the 
condition of the world. Since the time the Koran was revealed to the 
Prophet Muhammad, the states of Dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam) 
and Dar al-Harb (abode of war or conﬂict) have been in conﬂict and 
will remain so until the end of time (Lewis 2003). 
In the current state of Dar al-Harb, true believers of Islam are 
impelled to wage defensive jihad in order to reclaim lands once under 
the control of pious Muslims. These territories include parts of Spain 
and other areas of Europe ‘up to the gates of Rome’ and, of course, 
Israel. Once Muslims reclaim the land, then the struggle (jihad) 
moves to an offensive mode of conquest to ensure the remainder of 
the world is safe for Islam. In recent times, the USA has been viewed 
as the primary opponent in the Dar al-Harb because al-Qaeda and 
recognized Sunni religious leaders believe it has sided and conspired 
‘against Muslims’ in numerous conﬂicts around the world (e.g. Israel, 
East Timor, Serbia, the South Philippines, etc.) (Lewis 2003). 
Sunni extremism, however, is not a monolithic movement. It 
includes a number of different groups with varying philosophies. 
For example, the Salaﬁun or the Salaﬁ (an afﬁliation claimed by 
many in al-Qaeda), are part of a modern reform movement of 
Islam, founded by the Egyptian Muhammad ’Abduh (1849–1905). 
Salaﬁsm was preceded by the doctrine of Muhammad Ibn ’Abd al-
Wahhab (currently referred to as ‘Wahhabism’ or Unitarians), another 
fundamental ideology.1 
The severity and exclusiveness of the Salaﬁun and the earlier 
extremist Wahhabiun are arguably surpassed by movements such 
Takﬁr wal-Hijra and Takﬁr wal-Hikma. The principal adherents to 
this highly militant brand of extremism tend to be concentrated in 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. The ‘takﬁris’ believe that the pre-
eminent jihad calls for the death, ﬁrst and foremost, of Muslims born 
of the faith but who reject their narrowly literal application of the 
Koran and the Hadith. This has been referred to as a sort of modern- 
day ‘outing’ movement in the sense that takﬁris have a duty to 
identify and accuse non-takﬁri Muslims of being non-Muslim. From 
Egyptian president Husni Mubarrak to the entirety of Shia Islam, all 
have been designated by takﬁris as deserving nothing less than death 
for their un-Islamic ways (Elliott 2004). 
It is important to emphasize that to conduct an interrogation of a 
subject with an extremist ideology and a commitment to jihad, the 
interviewer must have some understanding of the subject’s ideology 
and the history associated with his thinking, commitments and 
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beliefs if he or she is to manage an interview better. In a rapport-
based approach it is critical to demonstrate respect for the subject. 
Without a knowledge of the subject’s ideology it is difﬁcult to 
interpret and manage the subject during the interview. The content 
of his communications will reﬂect where he stands, when he is being 
co-operative and when he is using his beliefs to engage in a personal 
jihad during the course of the interrogation. For some subjects, 
resisting the interrogator is a continuance of his personal jihad. During 
the course of an interrogation, adherence to his beliefs reinforces 
the subject’s expectations about the interrogator that inﬂuence his 
perceptions of the interrogator. He may use his beliefs to provoke 
the interrogator to react in a manner that conﬁrms his established 
or preconceived expectation of the interrogator as an apostate and 
inﬁdel. We have found that, by understanding his beliefs, we are 
better able to anticipate his communications and provocations, to 
react neutrally with a degree of respect and, eventually, to erode his 
expectations and perceptions through a rapport-based approach.
A ﬁnal caveat before moving on to more direct interrogation 
strategies is to address the issue of competing identities. Competing 
identities is a concept that is applied to individuals who are born, 
and to some degree raised, in a country that is different from where 
they reside and where they have been detained. Many people from 
the Middle East immigrate to Western and ﬁrst-world industrialized 
nations. These people are different from people who have lived their 
whole lives in their native country and who therefore reﬂect more 
strongly that country’s ethnic and cultural behaviours and attitudes. 
An individual who has lived in the West and, in particular has 
lived most of his life in the West will have assimilated some of the 
characteristics of his new-found homeland. This will, of course, vary 
based on the length of time he has lived in a Western country, the 
community he has lived in and the manner in which he has been 
raised. In many cases the degree of assimilation can be assessed by 
where people live, the peer group they have interacted with and 
the diversity of their experiences beyond the more ethnic or cultural 
activities indigenous to their native country. For example, we have 
found during the course of an interrogation that people who have 
lived in the West for a considerable period of time have a more in-
depth understanding of Westerners and therefore a different set of 
expectations. Additionally, depending on the degree of assimilation to 
Western thought and activities, immigrants from the Middle East who 
become subjects of terrorist investigations and interrogations tend to 
be more linear in their thinking. In some cases, the interrogations are 
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easier if the subject has lived in the West for a considerable period of 
time; in other cases, more difﬁcult, based on the subject’s expectation 
of what will occur and his knowledge of the laws.
Foundations of the rapport-based interview approach
The cornerstone of an interrogation that will yield the most reliable 
information is an effective, ongoing assessment of the subject. Before 
and during the interviews, the interview team should evaluate 
factors that are unique to the subject, or at least that distinguish him 
from other individuals who may be the subject of al-Qaeda-related 
investigations. 
A rapport-building (or relationship-based) approach will yield the 
best results in an interview/interrogation that occurs over days/
weeks/months. Rapport building is designed to develop a common 
understanding and respect between the interviewer and subject. The 
interviewer works to build a bond between the two of them based 
on commonalities and shared experiences in the interview room. 
Although sometimes difﬁcult to do, the interviewer should exhibit 
at least an apparent empathy for the subject’s beliefs, motivations and 
circumstances. Such an approach facilitates the information gathering 
process for two reasons. First, people tend to share their experiences 
with someone who is empathic, who values them and who, they 
feel, can understand them (Schafer and Navarro 2004). Secondly, the 
importance of relationships is fundamental to many people raised 
or with roots in the Middle East (Nydell 2002) – relationships are 
a vitalpart of a subject’s developmental and cultural experience. 
The relationship that develops during hours spent together 
between interviewer and subject may, in certain cases, approach 
or approximate a friendship. That friendship may be genuine or 
contrived, but the interviewer’s goal is always to elicit truthful and 
reliable information.
Whilst a relationship-based approach has generally been most 
effective with al-Qaeda-related subjects, individual cases may require 
a different strategy. No single interrogation or debrieﬁng technique 
will be successful in all situations. Interrogators tailor their approach 
to an interview and interrogation based on the current context and 
the background of the witness or subject. Ongoing assessment of 
continuously collected information about a subject’s behaviour and 
ideology will assist in identifying or creating moments of vulnerability 
for optimal elicitation. Each interviewee requires an individualized 
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approach that is dynamic and modiﬁed according to behavioural 
data collected from different sources (Schafer and Navarro 2004). The 
interviewer should build ﬂexibility into any interview plan. Changes 
in interview strategies and techniques should be guided by data from 
the ongoing assessment. 
Preparing for the interview
The attributes generally seen as desirable for a law enforcement 
interrogator (e.g. good intelligence, an understanding of human 
nature, an ability to get along well with others, patience and 
persistence) apply equally to interrogations of al-Qaeda detainees. 
There are some other speciﬁc considerations, however, that can affect 
the ‘ﬁt’ between interviewer and a Middle Eastern Arab al-Qaeda-
related subject. For example, age should be a consideration when 
matching or assigning an interviewer to a subject because of Arabic 
respect for elders and seniority (Nydell 2002). (The more experienced 
interviewers should similarly be assigned to those subjects who, it 
is believed, have the most important information). In general, care 
should be given to selecting an interviewer who can relate to the 
subject. If possible, the interviewer should speak the subject’s native 
language (or at least know some key terms of the language). 
Interrogations are most productive when the interrogator and 
subject can be paired consistently. Arabic people tend to respond 
best when interviewed by the same interrogator rather than with 
a round robin or ‘whoever is available’ assignment process (Nydell 
2002). Consistency allows the interrogator to become familiar with 
the subject’s history and to see how he responds to various questions 
and approaches. The subjects of investigations are not mechanical 
objects who can be turned on to pump out information. They require 
constant care and understanding if they are to respond. 
Members of the interview team should read all the available 
background information and be aware of all evidence seized with or 
associated with the subject. Sometimes ‘pocket litter’ in the subject’s 
possession at the time of apprehension, evidence seized during 
searches and statements from others can be helpful in assessing who 
the subject is (if his identity is in doubt) or what he has been doing. 
Pocket litter may also help to corroborate or disconﬁrm the subject’s 
statements and to aid help interviewer assess whether the subject is 
being deceptive. 
Collateral informants can also be a valuable source of information. 
Arresting ofﬁcers, guards, corrections ofﬁcers or other law enforcement 
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professionals who have observed the subject’s behaviour can assist 
the interviewer/interrogator to understand the subject. Correctional 
or detention staff, in particular, can provide information about how 
the subject behaves in detention and can help measure the impact 
of the prison environment on an interrogation plan. In a custodial 
environment, guards see and spend more time with a subject than 
does an interviewer. Therefore, they may be in an excellent position 
to monitor a subject’s behaviour and to observe comments and 
activities. Observations by the guards about whether a subject keeps 
to himself, gets support and counsel from others, about how and 
what he communicates to others, what he likes to eat, whether he 
exercises, etc., can greatly assist the interviewers in formulating 
interview strategies and building relationships with the subject 
(Walters 2002). 
The interrogator should not impose a time limit on an interview 
or an expectation of the frequency of interviews. The length of 
the interviews should vary. Having a set, routine block of time for 
interviews allows a subject to anticipate events better and thus to 
attempt to manipulate the interrogator and the process. For example, 
if in a conﬁned setting interviewing takes place for a speciﬁed amount 
of time for each subject, the remaining detainees can anticipate how 
long they will need to defend themselves and can practise steeling 
themselves to outlast the interviewer.
Operating with a translator
If a translator is needed, the translator’s role must be clearly deﬁned 
and continually reinforced so that he or she does not slide into 
the role of a surrogate interrogator. The interviewers must control 
the interrogation, not the interpreters. The interpreter must appear 
subordinate to the interviewer – someone working with and for the 
interviewer. As a practical matter, some have found it helpful to have 
the translator sit behind the subject.
Developing rapport
Developing rapport involves more than simply ‘being nice’ to a 
subject or giving him what he wants just to gain information. It 
requires a series of give-and-take interactions, under circumstances 
controlled by the interviewer. The interrogator needs to engage the 
subject in an extended conversation and to develop a relationship 
that helps to provide insight into the subject’s motivations and, 
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perhaps, deceptive practices or resistance techniques if he or she is 
to elicit accurate information (Walters 2002).
To build rapport, the interviewer engages in dialogue with the 
subject, during which he or she identiﬁes and assesses potential 
motivations, interests and vulnerabilities. Rapport is founded on a 
quid pro quo basis (the perceived ability of an interviewer to help 
the subject), on commonalities (family, wife, education, adversity), 
personality and mutual respect. Often, rapport-based approaches 
include adversarial arguments, disagreements, admonishments, 
criticism and challenging questions. These are always tempered with 
the fact that the subject knows that the interviewer is concerned 
about his future and is fair to him (Schafer and Navarro 2004).
In a rapport-based interview process, the interviewer shapes 
the relationship, using a variety of interpersonal, cognitive and 
emotional strategies and techniques, to gain critical information – or 
a confession – from the subject. The subject shares critical information 
with the interviewer because this collaborative relationship with 
the interrogator leads him to value the relationship more than the 
information he is perhaps trying to withhold. 
At the beginning of the relationship, questions of an investigative 
nature are purposely avoided. This is done to allow the subject 
and the interviewer to develop a bond on matters unrelated to the 
investigation. For example, news unrelated to terrorism that may be of 
interest to the subject has served as a good ice-breaker – for example, 
news about the World Cup. Offers of food and beverages may be 
used to build goodwill and, later, to be used as an incentive. Another 
productive line of inquiry involves having the subject talk about his 
country of origin and the interviewer showing an interest in learning 
about his country. In some cases, subjects have seemed particularly 
interested in maps and graphics (such as National Geographic maps). 
These might be used to point out signiﬁcant cities/towns/villages 
and paths of travel. 
Regardless of an interviewer’s own style, it is important to 
remember that a major goal of relationship building is for the subject 
to see the interviewer as a person (a ‘Rob’ rather than as an enemy). 
If a subject sees an interviewer as a person rather than an instrument 
of an ‘enemy’ government, when the subject refuses to talk, lies or 
is deceitful, he is offending that personal relationship. Because the 
relationship may matter more to the subject at the time than ‘doing 
his duty against the enemy’ (as he may have been trained to do), 
he may choose to share accurate information with the interview 
team. 
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Gathering information
The interview team should approach each interview with positive 
expectations. The interrogator – and team – should enter every 
interview session with conﬁdence that, over time, they will make a 
breakthrough with the subject. As noted above, rapport is probably 
the single most important element in creating a climate for eliciting 
information. The interviewer should not engage in a sensitive or 
probing inquiry at the beginning of the interview process or at the 
beginning of an individual session. This should only be done once 
rapport has been established or re-established. When getting to the 
essence of the interrogation, the interviewer should focus on the 
general and work towards the speciﬁc, all the while emphasizing 
the relationship – that is, the interviewer should concentrate on the 
relationship before mining for facts.
Once initial rapport has been established, a technique that has 
worked well for some investigators is to listen to the subject’s story 
with what appears to be an open mind. The interviewer should listen 
carefully both for content and for emotional and motivational cues. 
With such active listening, the interviewer can learn about the subject’s 
primary motivations (Walters 2002) (e.g. concerns about family, a son, 
a daughter, wife, money, coming to the West in the future, spreading 
the word of Islam or fatigue with the ‘jihad life’, etc.). 
During the initial storytelling phase, the interviewer does not 
interrupt or criticize as the subject lays out what may, in reality, be 
his cover story. Once he has laid out his full story, the interviewer 
can go back and ask him to go over it again in more detail and in 
a systematic manner, perhaps alternating queries from the general to 
the speciﬁc (Walters 2002).
In reviewing the story, the interviewer should ask detailed questions 
about every element. It may be that the subject will attempt to give as 
little information as possible to satisfy the interviewer. The challenge, 
then, is to identify meaningful, important or inconsistent details and 
sequences from the subject’s outline or story. The greater the level 
of the detail queried, the greater the likelihood that the subject will 
eventually ‘stumble’ over errors or inconsistencies in his cover story. 
Questions need to be very speciﬁc to guard against omission. This 
process may seem tedious – asking ten questions when it should 
only take two – but it is an important part of gathering reliable and 
accurate information.
In the detailed inquiry phase, the interviewer should insert or 
suggest some type of context or time-line reference, possibly using as 
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markers, seasons and Islamic holidays rather than Western calendar 
dates if the subject has not lived in the West or is not familiar 
with Western conventions about dates and time. When establishing 
locations with some subjects, the interviewer might use geographic 
descriptors: direction of prayer, geographic landmarks, valleys, rivers, 
mountains, lakes, etc. (e.g. along the road, across a bridge over a 
river, then along the riverbank).
When a time line has been established, the interviewer should 
have the subject explain all the details provided across the time line. 
As noted earlier, Middle Eastern Arab male’s usual way of thinking 
is associative rather than linear. Holding him to a ‘common sense’ 
time line of when various events happened may increase the conﬂict 
he experiences if he is giving a cover story. The subject may not be 
able to maintain consistency in the details of a fabricated time line. 
Recognizing the subject’s inconsistencies and confronting him with 
these in the context of a relationship that has developed between the 
subject and the interviewer may force the subject to recognize that 
the interviewer knows he is not telling the truth. 
Finally, the interview team should develop skills in assessing non-
verbal cues (Knapp and Hall 1997). There should be a mechanism 
for members of the team to report signiﬁcant observations to the 
interrogator. Some reactions, such as ‘cotton mouth’ (i.e. the white 
foamy saliva that collects at the corners of the mouth), are autonomic 
or physiological responses and may be regarded as stress reactions 
common to all peoples. Other non-verbal behaviours, such as 
crossing one’s arms or glancing away, may have particular cultural 
meanings. 
Developing themes
Much interrogation theory and practice relies heavily on the strategy 
of ‘theme development’. In the West, a ‘theme’ is an excuse or 
justiﬁcation for behaviour that the subject can acknowledge to save 
face. Theme development in Western criminal interrogation often 
involves mitigating the subject’s fear and/or guilt by helping the 
subject to justify the behaviour in his or her own mind or by diverting 
blame (e.g. to another person or to uncontrollable circumstances) 
(Inbau et al. 2001). These themes may require substantial modiﬁcation 
for use with subjects of Middle Eastern Arab al-Qaeda-related 
investigations. 
Al-Qaeda operatives, members and supporters may not feel shame 
or guilt in the Western sense for what they believe or for what they 
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have done. If they experience shame, it may be out of concern for 
what parents, family or others they respect are thinking about them. 
Other than this, Middle Eastern Arab subjects of al-Qaeda-related 
investigations are unlikely to feel shame as it is conceived in the 
West. Instead, they may feel honoured for what they have done 
or not done (for example, co-operated with the interrogators). The 
interviewer should understand and at least acknowledge a subject’s 
sense of honor. 
It is generally not productive for the interviewer to try to manipulate 
Western feelings of shame. If appropriate, however, the interviewer 
may express concern for the ‘trouble’ caused to the family at home 
or to others in the subject’s relationship world.
Other modiﬁcations of traditional interrogation practices may be 
required to develop themes of ‘justiﬁcation’ or themes not based on 
the subject’s anxiety or negative emotions. For example, one common 
interrogation strategy is to confront the subject with information that 
is inconsistent with what he has said. It is believed, however, that 
people afﬁliated with al-Qaeda often suspend critical thinking. They 
ignore information that contradicts their beliefs. Thus confronting a 
subject who has justiﬁed his actions by referring to the Koran with 
opposing viewpoints similarly based upon a study of the Koran may 
be ineffective. In general, it is not helpful or productive to argue with 
the subject about religion or to engage in a battle of wits (or quotes) 
regarding Islam. Instead, the interviewer can emphasize that he or 
she is determined to understand fully the matters at hand and is 
prepared to spend the time to do so. These matters – will and time 
– are squarely in the interviewer’s domain. 
Other traditional Western interrogation strategies involve the 
condemnation of accomplices or playing subjects off against their 
co-offenders (Leo 1996). Amongst members of al-Qaeda, however, 
loyalty to the brotherhood is paramount. Confronting a subject with 
the statements of another co-operating subject is not likely to be 
effective, especially in the early stages of an interrogation. 
The strength of the relationship between interviewer and subject 
is critical as the interview team develops themes that may facilitate 
disclosure of concealed information. At this point, the interview may 
assume some characteristics common to a negotiation. Two points 
are central. First, when the relationship has developed effectively, the 
subject becomes dependent on the interviewer. The interviewer is in 
control of what happens, and the subject is aware of this. Secondly, 
because the interviewer maintains the real power, he or she is in a 
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position to do favours or to grant requests. Accordingly, the subject’s 
disclosure of information often evolves on a quid pro quo basis. 
Favours, privileges or honoured requests should be contingent 
upon the subject’s co-operation. By granting/attempting to grant a 
request, the interviewer makes the subject feel obligated to ‘repay 
the favour’ (e.g. to co-operate with the interrogation process). The 
interviewer should expect and ask for a quid pro quo, whereby the 
subject demonstrates an appropriately co-operative response.
Managing resistance
The interview team needs to prepare for resistance. The team should 
have a plan for dealing with subjects who refuse to answer questions. 
For example, a subject who is supported by his network in a detention 
facility is likely to be prepared and to have several strategies that he 
plans to employ as resistance in the initial phases of the interview. 
The interviewer and support team need to be prepared to work 
through these resistances.
Recognizing and managing deception
Subjects of al-Qaeda-related investigations may lie or may try to 
conceal information at some point in the interview, particularly at the 
beginning when given the open-ended opportunity to tell their story. 
It is critical, whenever possible, to recognize and address possibly 
deceptive communications. 
False information provided by a subject may lead to signiﬁcant 
ﬁscal and personnel resources being wasted. Time and energy are 
expended on attempts to corroborate inaccurate reports or to deal 
with non-existing threats. Disinformation may also obscure potentially 
real threats by creating a confusing intelligence picture.
Moreover, if a subject lies successfully to the interviewer, the 
interviewer will lose credibility and the subject’s respect. Subsequent 
information provided by the subject will be less and less valuable. 
The subject learns that that he can deceive without any consequences 
and will be motivated to continue to manipulate and lie. 
The interviewer must recognize the lie (if possible) and not tolerate 
it. The key objective is to condition the subject to tell the truth. 
When the subject attempts deception, omission or other straying, the 
interviewer should discuss the fact that what the subject is saying is 
illogical or does not makes sense, and should work to get the subject 
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to acknowledge this. If the subject digresses or attempts to obfuscate 
(an anti-interrogation technique), the interrogator should ﬁrmly and 
immediately redirect him. When confronted with generalities or 
inconsistencies, the interviewer can attempt to force the content into 
a time line, offering facts that refute what a subject is saying and 
slowly and incrementally backing him into a corner of admission. 
In the context of the relationship that has been developed, the 
interviewer may exhibit disappointment or express a sense of feeling 
disrespected for being provided with false information. 
Conclusion
In this chapter we have outlined an approach for interviewing subjects 
of al-Qaeda-related investigations. The rapport-based approach 
described here appears to be the best and most effective approach 
to elicit reliable and accurate strategic information. Whilst there is 
debate regarding the use of more aggressive tactics in the face of 
critical intelligence that might impact on a nation’s security and 
safety, it is our opinion such techniques are morally and strategically 
inappropriate. Moreover, how we choose to treat suspects may affect 
how Westerner suspects are treated. Even in the popular ‘ticking time 
bomb’ scenario (Dershowitz 2002), aggressive tactics that humiliate, 
intimidate and cause physical pain and suffering, in our opinion, 
are unlikely to be effective. Such mistreatment merely reinforces the 
jihadists’ expectations of Western abuses. Of course, some subjects 
may provide information in response to aggressive tactics, but the 
information may be unreliable and misleading. Nevertheless, such 
tactics may at times be employed in ticking-bomb scenarios in a 
desperate attempt to do something rather than nothing.
When possible, it is held in this chapter that the use of a 
relationship-based approach is more likely to yield accurate and 
useful information. The essence of this approach is to lever the 
relationship between the subject and interrogator. Its tone typically 
is not sympathetic and supportive but, rather, direct and at times 
confrontational. The interrogator begins strategic inquiry only after 
rapport and a relationship have been established. This general 
approach has been effective in many terrorism investigations and 
has often produced reliable and actionable information that could be 
corroborated, validated and subsequently used at trial. 
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Note
1. See Dore Gold’s Hatred’s Kingdom for the accounts of the plundering 
of and killing in Shia cities of Najaf and Karbala c. 1799–1803 by the 
descendents of the Muhammad Ibn ’Abd al-Wahhab and the Muhammad 
Ibn Sa’ud alliance. This early period of ‘Wahhabism’ was characterized 
by death and destruction in the name of God, and not just for the worst 
of the apostates. According to this belief system, those deserving of death 
included Shia and Sunni ‘brothers’ in Mecca and Medina who would 
challenge the Wahhabi brand of Islam.
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